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**Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights
situations and reports of special rapporteurs
and representatives**

Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution [80/221](#) and covers the period from 1 August 2025 to 31 July 2026. It highlights the deepening crisis in Myanmar since the 2021 military takeover, marked by sustained armed conflict, grave protection risks, worsening humanitarian and socioeconomic conditions and serious regional implications. Military operations, including air strikes, caused high civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure. More than 3.96 million people have been internally displaced, and humanitarian needs remained severe amid conflict, access restrictions and funding shortfalls, compounded by public health deterioration and rising food insecurity. Women, children and young people were subjected to conflict-related sexual violence, trafficking, exploitation, forced recruitment and other grave violations. Bangladesh hosts over 1.2 million Rohingya refugees, almost 80 per cent of whom are women and children who are dependent on humanitarian assistance at a time of funding shortfalls, reduced services and heightened protection risks. Conditions for their voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return do not currently exist. In Rakhine State, the remaining Rohingya and other communities faced acute protection risks owing to conflict and severe access constraints. Myanmar remained a major hub for illicit economies, including large-scale drug production, trafficking in persons and scam operations, with regional and global repercussions. The military authorities oversaw a contested electoral process against a background of insecurity, restricted civic space and major limitations on political participation. There was no meaningful progress towards inclusive dialogue. The President, Win Myint, was released from detention, reportedly under strict conditions, while the State Counsellor, Aung San Suu Kyi, remains detained incommunicado. The Secretary-General and his Special Envoy on Myanmar remained actively engaged, including with Myanmar

* [A/81/150](#).



stakeholders, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and neighbouring countries, to press for an end to violence, inclusive dialogue, greater humanitarian access, the protection of Rohingya and other minorities and a Myanmar-led political solution.

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution [80/221](#) of 18 December 2025, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to continue to provide his good offices relating to Myanmar, involving all relevant stakeholders, to offer assistance to Myanmar and to submit a report covering all relevant issues addressed in the resolution to the Assembly at its eighty-first session. This report covers the period from 1 August 2025 to 31 July 2026.

2. The crisis in Myanmar deepened, marked by sustained armed conflict, grave protection risks for civilians, as well as worsening humanitarian and socioeconomic conditions. Military operations, including air strikes, caused high civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure, while displacement, food insecurity and public health challenges increased. Earthquake recovery efforts continued but faced operational constraints. Women, as well as children and young people, were particularly targeted for conflict-related violence, trafficking, exploitation, recruitment and use, and other grave violations. The crisis had significant regional consequences, including large-scale displacement and an increase in illicit activities.

3. Throughout the reporting period, the Secretary-General, his Special Envoy on Myanmar, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and other United Nations officials repeatedly condemned escalating violence and called for its cessation, civilian protection, unhindered humanitarian access and the release of all those arbitrarily detained. Following the reported transfer of the State Counsellor, Aung San Suu Kyi, in April 2026, to a designated residential detention site, the Secretary-General reiterated his appeal for the swift and unconditional release of all those arbitrarily detained as a fundamental step towards a credible political process grounded in an immediate cessation of violence and inclusive dialogue.¹

4. In a statement delivered to mark five years since the military seized power and arbitrarily detained members of the democratically elected Government, the Secretary-General warned that suffering had deepened amid persistent impunity, reported widespread violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, escalating violence and serious regional ramifications. He condemned all forms of violence, urged all parties to exercise maximum restraint, ensure humanitarian access and protect all communities, including the Rohingya. He reiterated that a viable path back to civilian rule must be founded on an immediate cessation of violence and inclusive dialogue with the full participation of civil society, including women, youth and ethnic minority communities.²

5. The situation of Rohingya and other minorities remained of grave concern. In August 2025, eight years since the forced mass displacement of Rohingya from Rakhine State, the Secretary-General warned of further deterioration in their dire circumstances inside and outside Myanmar. He highlighted their continued exposure in Rakhine State to violence, forced recruitment, human rights violations and other abuses, and the precarious situation of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh amid funding cuts and shrinking protection space. The Secretary-General also reiterated his call, made during his 2025 visit to Bangladesh, for stronger international solidarity

¹ See <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statements/2026-05-01/statement-attributable-the-spokesperson-for-the-secretary-general-myanmar>.

² See <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statements/2026-01-30/statement-attributable-the-spokesperson-for-the-secretary-general-the-5-year-mark-of-the-military-takeover-myanmar>.

and support, alongside efforts towards a comprehensive political solution that meaningfully includes the Rohingya and addresses the root causes of the crisis.³

6. The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General continued direct contact with all sides of the crisis – maintaining dialogue with relevant Member States and parties. She visited Myanmar twice during the reporting period, marking her third and fourth visits, and continued to engage all stakeholders, in close cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other regional partners, to seek common ground for a Myanmar-led, durable resolution to the crisis. Under the leadership of the first stand-alone Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator ad interim since 2021, the United Nations country team continues to stay and deliver assistance to the people of Myanmar. The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, concluded his mandate in March and was succeeded by Kelley Anne Eckels-Currie.

II. Context and political developments

A. Situation on the ground

Conflict dynamics

7. Armed conflict persisted across multiple regions of Myanmar during and after the military-administered electoral process. The Myanmar military continued operations to reassert control over towns, transport corridors and areas held or contested by ethnic armed organizations and other armed resistance actors. Following the renewed declaration of a state of emergency and imposition of martial law orders across 60 townships in April 2026, the military reportedly intensified aerial bombardments, triggering civilian displacement. Attacks continued to affect civilian infrastructure, such as schools, health facilities and religious sites, including in locations where no active hostilities had been reported.

8. Civilian protection risks were reflected in high civilian casualties from air strikes, artillery, landmines and explosive ordnance, while the destruction of civilian property continued in several conflict-affected areas, particularly central Myanmar. Landmines and explosive ordnance posed serious risks, restricted movement and undermined livelihoods around villages, farmland and water sources. Children continued to be subjected to killing and maiming, including in attacks on schools and hospitals, recruitment and use, and other grave violations. Aerial attacks by jet fighters, helicopters, drones, paramotors and gyrocopters supported military efforts to assert control of contested areas throughout the electoral process.

9. During the reporting period, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners said that it had verified the deaths of at least 1,153 civilians, including 384 women and 227 children. Aerial attacks accounted for 794 deaths, almost 70 per cent of the total, which included 276 women and 171 children.⁴ Verification remained constrained by access restrictions. Open-source data suggest that the number of civilian deaths may be as high as 2,900 for the reporting period and over 16,000 in total since 2021.

10. The situation in Rakhine State is severe. The remaining Rohingya population, already facing long-standing discrimination, movement restrictions and limited

³ See <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statements/2025-08-22/statement-attributable-the-spokesperson-for-the-secretary-general-the-eighth-anniversary-of-the-displacement-of-rohingya-people-and-other-communities-myanmar>.

⁴ See <https://aappb.org/>.

access to services, faced overlapping protection threats amid active conflict and shifting territorial control. Reports continued of forced recruitment, arbitrary arrest, extortion and other abuses by the conflict parties, affecting Rohingya and other communities. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported that both the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army continued to commit violations and abuses with impunity against the Rohingya.⁵ The Arakan Army expanded or consolidated control across much of Rakhine, while the Myanmar military retained limited positions, and civilians were caught between competing authorities and armed actors.

11. Continued conscription by the Myanmar military and recruitment by some armed non-State actors placed young people at heightened risk, including Rohingya youth and children lacking legal documentation for age verification. Many continued to flee their communities or the country to avoid recruitment, increasing their exposure to trafficking, exploitation and unsafe migration.

Humanitarian situation

12. The humanitarian crisis in Myanmar deteriorated, driven by ongoing conflict, displacement, natural hazards, funding shortfalls and severe operational constraints. More than 3.96 million people were estimated to be internally displaced nationwide. In 2025, severe funding shortfalls – with only 29 per cent of the \$1.4 billion required received – forced humanitarian partners in Myanmar to prioritize people with the most life-threatening needs, reducing the frequency and coverage of assistance. Despite these constraints, partners reached 6.3 million people with some form of assistance, representing 94 per cent of the 6.7 million targeted, including 1.7 million people reached as part of the earthquake response.

13. The 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan identified 16.2 million people in need, of whom 2.6 million with the most extreme needs were prioritized for life-saving assistance. Against a requirement of \$890 million to reach 4.9 million people, the plan was 46 per cent funded, equivalent to \$411 million. In the first quarter of 2026, humanitarian partners reached nearly 1.6 million people, representing 33 per cent of targeted individuals and 32 per cent of those prioritized.

14. Humanitarian operations were impacted by the fuel and energy shock linked to the conflict in the Middle East, which contributed to overall inflation in Myanmar surging to 24.6 per cent year-on-year in April 2026. Consequently, food security in Myanmar worsened as high transport, logistics and fertilizer costs drove up the prices of essential goods. Combined with electricity outages, movement restrictions and deteriorating infrastructure, these pressures forced agencies to scale back community outreach, protection monitoring and field missions. Humanitarian access remained highly constrained, especially in areas contested or controlled by resistance actors, with conflict the primary driver of service interruptions. Travel authorization delays, checkpoint controls, violence and threats targeting aid workers, landmines and explosive ordnance compounded the fragile operating environment and limited assistance delivery.

Illicit activities

15. Illicit drug production, trafficking and cyber-enabled crime continued to pose serious regional and global risks, with Myanmar remaining central to several illicit economies. Methamphetamine seizures in East and South-East Asia reached 349 tons in 2025, while opium poppy cultivation in Myanmar increased by 17 per cent to

⁵ See <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/myanmar/human-situation-update-myanmar-2025-en.pdf>.

53,100 hectares.⁶ The regional synthetic drug market, valued at an estimated \$61.4 billion, and the heroin market, valued at \$10.3 billion, continued to expand, while the opiate economy in Myanmar remained significant, at an estimated \$641 million to \$1.05 billion.⁷ In January 2026, Myanmar authorities reported the dismantling of industrial-scale drug facilities in the largest-ever narcotics seizure. New psychoactive substances also continued to spread regionally, with particular risks for vulnerable groups, including youth and conflict-affected communities.

16. Cyber-enabled fraud and related trafficking intensified as Myanmar remained a key hub for transnational scam networks, with trafficking for forced criminality and cyberfraud being prominent forms of exploitation. The Myawaddy–Mae Sot corridor remained a major recruitment, transit and repatriation route, with vulnerable people lured through deceptive job offers into plantation and scam operations. Young people were particularly exposed, as unemployment, school disruption, conscription and unsafe migration pathways made informal income opportunities more attractive or broker networks harder to avoid. OHCHR estimates that at least 300,000 people work in scam centres across South-East Asia, including in Myanmar, and that victims originate from across the world, particularly South-East, South and East Asia, as well as Africa, the Middle East and North and South America.⁸

17. Foreign and Myanmar nationals continued to be trafficked into guarded compounds and coerced into criminal activity while compelled to meet strict financial targets. Survivors reported slave-like conditions, including violence, sexual abuse and torture. Thousands of foreign nationals reportedly remained trapped, while some rescued or released victims were stranded in border areas with limited services or consular support and serious risks of re-trafficking. In the first half of 2026, the United Nations received 773 referrals involving victims from more than 35 countries. Reports indicated increasing recruitment of Myanmar nationals, exposing them to heightened exploitation risks across the region.

18. Trilateral and regional efforts by authorities, including action by China and Thailand, led to the release of thousands of victims. However, greater coordination was required as scam operations in Myanmar expanded in scale, reach and sophistication, increasingly using artificial intelligence, automation and data-driven targeting, with some compounds that had previously been closed reportedly resuming operations under reorganized models. Weak reintegration support and continued recruitment remained persistent challenges faced by victims upon release or repatriation.

Political developments

19. On 31 July 2025, the National Defence and Security Council discontinued the state of emergency, dissolved the State Administration Council and announced the State Security and Peace Commission, headed by the then Commander-in-Chief, Min Aung Hlaing, to oversee national defence and security and preparations for elections. The military authorities conducted a three-phase electoral process in December 2025 and January 2026 in 263 of 330 townships amid continuing armed conflict, insecurity, restricted civic space and severe limitations on political participation. Prior to the polls, an election protection law was enacted, and at least 404 individuals reportedly faced legal action, largely over criticism of the electoral process, with some receiving

⁶ See https://www.unodc.org/roseap/uploads/documents/Publications/2026/Synthetic_Drugs_in_East_and_Southeast_Asia_2026.pdf.

⁷ See https://www.unodc.org/roseap/uploads/documents/Publications/2025/Myanmar_Opium_survey_2025_web.pdf.

⁸ See <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/trafficking/report-a-wicked-problem.pdf>.

lengthy prison sentences. While authorities reported participation by 57 political parties, only 9 were contesting seats nationwide, and several major political parties were excluded, having been deregistered in 2023. Official figures indicated voter turnout of 54 per cent; however, reports suggested that, in some areas, participation rates were low and voting under pressure or intimidation occurred. Displaced communities, including Rohingya, remained largely disenfranchised and excluded from the process.

20. The reported results gave the military-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party, together with military-appointed representatives, a dominant position in the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. In April, the military legislature elected Min Aung Hlaing as its political leader and confirmed his appointments for national and subnational positions. The Cabinet and the state and regional leadership remained composed largely of individuals with military or security backgrounds, and decision-making remained concentrated within a narrow male-dominated leadership structure.

21. In April, Min Aung Hlaing announced measures framed to promote stability and reconciliation, including amnesties, commutation of death sentences and reductions in prison terms. The President, Win Myint, was released from detention, reportedly subject to strict conditions, while the State Counsellor, Aung San Suu Kyi, was reported to have been transferred from prison detention to a designated location in Nay Pyi Taw, where she remained incommunicado. At 81 years old, she has spent 20 years of her life in detention, and her recent transfer has yet to be independently verified. The Secretary-General reiterated his call for the immediate and unconditional release of all those arbitrarily detained, including the State Counsellor.

22. As part of a 100-day plan, Min Aung Hlaing called for engagement with ethnic armed organizations and for members of the People's Defence Forces to surrender by 31 July. However, operations by the military continued in several parts of the country, including efforts to reassert control over key towns and strategic trade routes. Armed resistance actors also continued to operate across multiple theatres.

23. Opposition actors announced efforts to strengthen political and military coordination, including through the new Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union, yet coherence and inclusivity remained uneven and prospects for inclusive dialogue remained a work in progress. The evolving territorial and administrative landscape, including areas where ethnic and opposition actors exercise de facto authority and deliver services, shows that governance now extends beyond formal structures in Nay Pyi Taw.

International and regional engagements

24. The United Nations continued to use its good offices and intergovernmental platforms to call for an end to violence, civilian protection, full humanitarian access and an inclusive political solution. During the reporting period, the Secretary-General and the Special Envoy continued to engage with a broad range of Myanmar stakeholders, ASEAN and neighbouring countries, including on the military-administered electoral process, protection of Rohingya and other minorities, and conditions for voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return. The General Assembly, the Security Council and the Human Rights Council also remained seized of the situation through briefings, interactive dialogues and resolutions addressing the human rights, humanitarian and political dimensions of the crisis. Their consistent calls for a cessation of hostilities, inclusive dialogue, unfettered humanitarian access and the release of political prisoners have largely not been heeded.

25. The High-level Conference on the Situation of Rohingya Muslims and Other Minorities in Myanmar, held in September 2025, reaffirmed the international

commitment to supporting Myanmar, Bangladesh and other countries in seeking solutions to the crisis. Participants underscored the need to address the root causes of Rohingya displacement, create conditions conducive to voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return, and expand burden- and responsibility-sharing, including through humanitarian support, resilience, self-reliance and third-country solutions. The Special Envoy and civil society briefers emphasized that any political solution must meaningfully include the Rohingya and be shaped by their voices.

26. In an informal meeting of the General Assembly plenary on 19 June 2026, the Special Envoy highlighted that Myanmar presents a critical opportunity for the United Nations, working with ASEAN and other partners, to demonstrate its relevance in a world beset by conflict. She appealed to the international community to remain steadfast in solidarity with the people of Myanmar and be guided by their appeals for help.

27. The United Nations continued to work with ASEAN to advance the five-point consensus and promote de-escalation, humanitarian access and an inclusive political process. At the ASEAN-United Nations Summit in October 2025, the Secretary-General reiterated calls for an immediate end to the violence and a genuine commitment to inclusive dialogue, and welcomed strengthened cooperation between the United Nations Special Envoy and her ASEAN counterpart.⁹ In January 2026, the Philippines assumed the rotating ASEAN Chair and appointed its Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Theresa Lazaro, as the ASEAN Special Envoy on Myanmar. Coordination between the United Nations and ASEAN Special Envoys remained critical, and they conducted joint briefings to the Security Council in private meetings on 22 December 2025 and 6 March 2026.

28. In January 2026, the ASEAN foreign ministers reaffirmed that meaningful political progress required an environment of peace, security and inclusivity, a cessation of violence and inclusive dialogue among all relevant stakeholders, while reiterating the importance of free, fair, peaceful, transparent, inclusive and credible elections in Myanmar.¹⁰ At the ASEAN Summit in May, leaders expressed deep concern over the escalating conflict, the humanitarian situation and the minimal progress made on the implementation of the five-point consensus.¹¹ At the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting in July, participants agreed to develop benchmarks for measuring progress in Myanmar and continued discussions on appointing a longer-term ASEAN Special Envoy. ASEAN and its member States engaged Myanmar stakeholders throughout the reporting period, including during informal meetings held in Thailand in July 2026, while regional discussions reflected growing concern over cross-border implications, including displacement, protection at sea, trafficking in persons, cyber-enabled scam operations, trafficking in narcotics and other transnational criminal activity. Despite these efforts, differing approaches among regional and international actors, ongoing violence and the absence of an inclusive political process continued to limit progress.

⁹ See <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-events/2025-10-27/secretary-generals-press-conference-the-asean-un-summit-kuala-lumpur>.

¹⁰ See <https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/FINAL-Press-Statement-by-the-Chair-of-the-ASEAN-Foreign-Ministers-Retreat.pdf>.

¹¹ See <https://asean.org/chairs-statement-of-the-48th-asean-summit/>.

B. Human rights

Shrinking civic space and restrictions on freedom of opinion and expression

29. Civic space and freedom of expression in Myanmar remained extremely limited as repression continued, including during the polls. Arrests linked to online expression and criticism of the elections increased, with prison sentences imposed for social media activity and perceived opposition to the military. At least 404 individuals were reportedly arbitrarily arrested and prosecuted for disrupting the election, with some of those convicted facing long prison sentences of up to 49 years.

30. Myanmar remained among the world's most unsafe environments for journalists, ranking 166th out of 180 countries and territories in the 2026 World Press Freedom Index. Since the military takeover, the independent media have faced arrests, killings, licence revocations, Internet shutdowns and other restrictions. At least 10 journalists have been killed by the military or unidentified armed groups since 2021 according to the Observatory of Killed Journalists of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, while more than 219 journalists have been arrested and charged under various laws, under provisions on incitement, dissemination of "false news" and counter-terrorism. A total of 19 journalists reportedly remain in detention, while 22 media outlets have had licences revoked and 21 independent media organizations have suspended operations.

31. Restrictions on digital communications also intensified. The military-dominated National Defence and Security Council introduced the Central Equipment Identity Register and required that mobile device users register the international mobile equipment identity (IMEI) number of devices, as well as the user's national identification number and telephone number. As a result, the authorities can now link IMEI numbers to subscriber identity module (SIM) card information and identify the individual who is using a specific device. This system has increased the capacity of the military authorities to monitor communications, raising concerns for privacy, digital freedoms and the safety of journalists, activists and human rights defenders. The military expanded its use of surveillance technologies, including the Person Scrutinization and Monitoring System, which combines smart identity tracking, closed-circuit television (CCTV) networks and artificial intelligence.

32. Internet access remained restricted in an estimated 131 townships, particularly in conflict-affected areas, including Rakhine State. According to humanitarian actors, continued interruptions to telephone and Internet services in Rakhine since January 2024 further impeded communications and coordination. In January 2026, the Arakan Army announced registration and payment requirements for private satellite Internet use amid ongoing communication blackouts. These measures curtailed essential services for affected populations, including Rohingya communities, and undermined freedom of expression and the flow of independent information.

Women and peace and security

33. Deteriorating security, escalating armed conflict, the socioeconomic crisis and the March 2025 earthquake exacerbated the vulnerability and protection risks for women, girls and individuals marginalized on the basis of their gender identity or sexual orientation. Women's meaningful participation across the fragmented governance landscape of Myanmar varied depending on the controlling actor but remained low overall, particularly in decision-making positions. Rohingya women faced the most acute exclusion, while ethnic minority women secured comparatively greater participation in several opposition structures, but continued to face overlapping barriers linked to conflict, ethnic identity and entrenched patriarchal norms.

34. The widespread and systematic use of sexual violence continued to be a grave concern. While the Myanmar military remained the primary perpetrator of conflict-related sexual violence, incidents involving ethnic armed organizations and resistance forces were also reported. Most cases remained unreported by survivors due to fear, stigma and the absence of effective and confidential referral mechanisms. The United Nations received reports of rape, sexual assault and harassment against women and LGBTQI+ individuals, particularly in detention and interrogation centres. It was also reported that sexual violence occurred during village raids and ground operations and at checkpoints, with gang rape and sexual extortion used as tools of repression (see [S/2026/321](#)).

35. Information provided by actors on the ground indicates that incidents of gender-based violence persisted, particularly sexual violence, physical assault and psychological abuse. Access to medical care remained constrained. Reports indicate that many women political prisoners face restricted access to adequate medical care and other essential services. In Rakhine State, Rohingya women and girls continued to face structural barriers to justice and protection, including male-dominated dispute resolution mechanisms, movement restrictions, extortion and lack of documentation.

36. Mandatory conscription by the military raised serious concerns, including of sexual violence, which were also linked to exemptions for married women reportedly increasing the risks of forced marriage and trafficking of women and girls. Economic hardship also continues to drive many women into survival sex in order to sustain their families, exposing them to exploitation, threats and physical abuse. Digital violence against women and girls has escalated, including through pro-military social media channels targeting individuals affiliated with the resistance, circulating sexually explicit images and using hate speech to discredit them.

37. Despite playing a critical front-line role in responding to gender-based violence and conflict-related sexual violence, women-led and women's rights organizations operated under severe constraints, including legal ambiguity, surveillance and security threats. Many remained unregistered and faced major obstacles to funding, service delivery and coordination, while support structures for Rohingya women remained especially limited and often male-dominated. Moreover, funding cuts significantly undermined local actors' capacity to deliver essential health and safe shelter services and document sexual violence.

Young people and children

38. Access to education was highly constrained by insecurity, displacement, school closures, attacks on education facilities, the presence of landmines and weakened formal systems. In conflict-affected and displaced communities, learning increasingly depended on underresourced temporary, community-based arrangements, which are often reliant on volunteers and offer limited pathways to accredited secondary and higher education. Young people also faced heightened risks linked to conscription by all sides, forced recruitment, unsafe migration, trafficking, loss of livelihoods and illicit economies.

39. In 2025, 2,203 grave violations against 1,746 children (1,097 boys, 638 girls, 11 sex unknown) were verified. Most of the 1,227 child casualties were caused by air strikes, drone attacks and explosive weapons and ordnance. Recruitment and use affected 284 children, mostly boys, who were used in both combat and support roles. Attacks on 169 schools and hospitals resulted in 207 child casualties, underscoring the devastating impact of the conflict on children. A total of 13 cases of sexual violence against girls were also verified (see [A/80/723-S/2026/357](#)).

40. Rohingya children and young people in Rakhine State faced particularly acute and protracted risks. Deprived of citizenship and subject to long-standing restrictions on movement and access to services, they remained exposed to armed conflict, discrimination and limited access to protection, education, health and livelihood opportunities. Rohingya youth were largely excluded from accredited education pathways, with long-term consequences for skills development and future prospects. Reports of forced recruitment affecting Rohingya youth increased following the implementation of military service measures, while lack of legal documentation has reduced safeguards for age verification and left children and young people vulnerable to detention, exploitation and recruitment by armed actors.

41. Deteriorating economic conditions continue to disproportionately affect young people. Inflation, fuel shortages, supply chain disruptions and business closures due to conflicts have significantly reduced livelihood opportunities, pushing many young people into risky coping mechanisms. Displacement and irregular migration have exposed young people to exploitation within illicit economies, such as scam centres and transnational criminal networks, particularly in border areas. Growing digital surveillance and restrictions on online expression have also contributed to a climate of distress among young people, limiting freedom of speech.

42. Yet, young people continue to remain at the forefront of civic resistance and community resilience efforts. Youth-led networks and local initiatives take the form of activism, humanitarian support and participation in local governance, reflecting their continued determination to shape their communities and future despite ongoing conflict and instability.

Accountability

43. The Secretary-General and his Special Envoy have stressed that addressing the cycle of impunity in Myanmar and ensuring accountability are essential for national reconciliation. The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar continued to investigate alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes in Myanmar, including reported indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, obstruction of humanitarian aid, arbitrary detention, sexual violence and torture.

44. The landmark hearings that were held in January 2026 in the case concerning *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar)* before the International Court of Justice marked a significant step towards accountability.

45. Proceedings in the investigations by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court are ongoing. The application filed by the Prosecutor in November 2024 for an arrest warrant against the former Commander-in-Chief, Min Aung Hlaing, for alleged crimes against humanity of deportation and persecution against the Rohingya in 2017 remains under consideration by Pre-Trial Chamber I.

46. Proceedings in the investigations by the Federal Prosecutor of Argentina regarding crimes against the Rohingya are also ongoing. Criminal complaints filed by non-governmental organizations regarding possible serious international crimes committed in Myanmar are also pending consideration by authorities in Australia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Timor-Leste and Türkiye, under the principle of universal jurisdiction.

C. Situation of the Rohingya and vulnerable communities

Stateless and internally displaced persons

47. Inside Myanmar, displacement continued to rise. As at 20 July 2026, almost 3.96 million people were internally displaced, including more than 3.7 million since the 2021 military takeover and 234,000 people in protracted displacement. The largest concentrations were in the north-west, including in Sagaing, Magway, Mandalay and Chin, where there are almost 2 million internally displaced persons, followed by the south-east, including in Kayin, Mon, Bago and Tanintharyi, where there are some 948,600 internally displaced persons. Rakhine State hosted approximately 500,000 internally displaced persons, including almost 225,000 Rohingya in confined camps.¹²

48. The right to a nationality remained unfulfilled for most minorities that are not among the 135 recognized ethnic groups, who continued to face discriminatory, exclusionary and arbitrary practices. In Rakhine State, more than 519,200 people, the majority of them Rohingya, remained stateless. Access to citizenship and civil documentation remained restricted, with Rohingya required to identify as “Bengali” or another officially recognized ethnicity to apply for citizenship, denying their right to self-identification. Barriers to birth registration and restrictions on movement further entrenched exclusion.

49. The conflict in Rakhine State, particularly in the north, continued to threaten housing, land and property rights, especially for displaced persons and customary land users. Land-grabbing remained prevalent, particularly in strategic areas linked to resources and security.

Displacement across borders

50. The total number of refugees from Myanmar in the region stood at 1.62 million, of whom 1.3 million were Rohingya. More than 1.2 million Rohingya refugees remained in Bangladesh, while more than 151,300 are in other countries in the region. Driven by conflict, persecution, insecurity and the lack of durable solutions, between 1 February 2021 and 30 June 2026, 302,100 refugees and asylum-seekers fled Myanmar, among them 153,600 new arrivals in Bangladesh since January 2024. Some 63,000 new arrivals remain in India and 25,500 in Malaysia. Some 55,000 who fled to Thailand have since returned, while tens of thousands of others remain in Thailand without a clear status. Reports of pushbacks, removals and deportations persisted across the region, raising serious concerns regarding non-refoulement and shrinking asylum space. Many refugees continued to be detained indefinitely, often without appropriate medical care and access denied to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Several deaths in detention were reported.

51. A significant global decrease in resettlement spaces since 2025 has reduced prospects for third-country solutions. A total of 3,877 refugees from Myanmar departed from the region for resettlement in third countries in 2025, a 62 per cent decrease from 2024. More than 1,500 refugees from Myanmar departed from countries of asylum on complementary pathways in 2025, among them the first departure from Bangladesh on an education pathway to the Philippines. In 2025, Thailand adopted a resolution granting the right to work to tens of thousands of long-staying refugees from Myanmar and, by June 2026, nearly 6,000 refugees had been legally employed. Malaysia is rolling out a national refugee registration system that is intended to replace the system managed by UNHCR.

¹² See <https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/mmr>.

52. Deteriorating security and socioeconomic conditions also continued to drive irregular land and maritime movements. In the first six months of 2026, 14,500 people attempted onward movements, including 5,700 by sea and 8,800 by land, the highest recorded level of attempted maritime movement since data collection began in 2022. At least 820 people were reported dead or missing at sea during that period, including more than 500 people who were aboard two boats that reportedly capsized off the coast of Myanmar in June 2026. In 2025 alone, some 900 Rohingya were reported missing or dead in the Andaman Sea and Bay of Bengal, making it the deadliest year for Rohingya refugees on record on the deadliest maritime route globally, highlighting the importance of a route-based approach to prevent dangerous journeys.

53. In Bangladesh, more than 1.2 million Rohingya refugees in Cox's Bazar and some 34,000 on Bhasan Char Island remained dependent on humanitarian assistance delivered under the 2025–2026 Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis. Almost 80 per cent are women and children. In response to evolving realities and funding constraints, the Joint Response Plan in Bangladesh was significantly recalibrated for 2026. At the time of launch, the amount requested for the appeal was 25 per cent less than the amount that had been requested for 2025 appeal, despite growing humanitarian needs and the refugee population. Pending a government decision to expand the camps, shelter for new arrivals continued to be excluded from the assistance package, contributing to overcrowding, exposure to exploitation and abuse, tensions within and between communities and heightened vulnerability to natural hazards. The funding cuts curtailed education, food assistance, healthcare and protection services, contributing to negative coping mechanisms. On 1 April, the World Food Programme introduced a needs-based targeting and prioritization model for food rations. The international community reaffirmed its support at the Global Refugee Forum Progress Review in December 2025. Pledging entities have reported an 86 per cent implementation rate for the 35 commitments made to support the Rohingya community.¹³

54. Conditions in the camps in Bangladesh remained fragile, with deteriorating security linked to criminal networks and armed group activity. Women, girls and young people in particular faced heightened protection risks, including gender-based violence, trafficking and forced recruitment. Between March 2025 and March 2026, at least six cases of femicide were documented. Women and adolescent girls remained largely excluded from male-led leadership structures and camp decision-making and have called for direct representation.

Voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable repatriation of refugees

55. The majority of the 1.3 million Rohingya refugees in the region have consistently expressed the wish to return to Myanmar, provided conditions for voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return are in place. Those conditions – citizenship, security guarantees, freedom of movement and return to places of origin or choice – remain unmet. Rakhine State remained affected by active conflict, prolonged blockades, martial law, severe movement restrictions and limited access to livelihoods and services. Protection risks persisted, including arbitrary arrest, forced recruitment, extortion, trafficking and detention, particularly in and around displacement settings. Some possible return sites are under the control of the Arakan Army, raising concerns about coordination, access, and safety and protection guarantees. While the Government of Bangladesh and authorities in Nay Pyi Taw held discussions and Bangladesh continued to advocate for international support to a return road map, this did not result in tangible steps towards voluntary returns. Small

¹³ See <https://globalcompactrefugees.org/about/global-refugee-forum-progress-review/global-refugee-forum-progress-review-2025>.

numbers of Rohingya continued to return spontaneously from Bangladesh, but some reportedly faced detention and extortion upon arrival, underscoring the risks of premature return. The conditions were not in place for safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return during the reporting period.

D. Public health and the socioeconomic situation

Public health

56. Communities across Myanmar faced severe challenges in accessing essential health and immunization services, as a weakened and underresourced health system, compounded by insecurity, displacement and access restrictions, limited life-saving care. In Rakhine State, the health system has largely collapsed, with service delivery relying on local actors, community volunteers and a limited number of healthcare partners that are facing acute shortages of medicines, supplies and trained personnel. Repeated attacks on health facilities, personnel and infrastructure further eroded access, with facilities damaged or closed, health workers displaced or targeted and routine and emergency care disrupted.

57. Critical immunization for children remained severely affected, with coverage at low levels across the country, leaving many children zero-dose or underimmunized and at heightened risk of vaccine-preventable diseases, including measles. This contributed to vulnerabilities in a country with one of the highest under-5 mortality rates in South-East Asia.¹⁴ The 28 March 2025 earthquake damaged health infrastructure, disrupted supply chains and limited access to clean water, sanitation and essential medicines, while increasing risks of disease outbreaks and interruptions to maternal and child healthcare services. Children and adolescents exposed to violence, displacement and trauma faced growing mental health and psychosocial needs.

58. Sexual and reproductive health services remained critically hampered. Restrictions on the importation of essential medicines and reproductive health commodities, shortages of supplies, movement restrictions, checkpoints and curfews impeded access to maternal, newborn and adolescent healthcare. Time-sensitive complications often went untreated, contributing to preventable morbidity and mortality. Women and girls in displacement settings, Rohingya communities and persons with disabilities faced additional barriers linked to stigma, documentation requirements, movement restrictions and limited services. In rural and conflict-affected areas, ethnic women's organizations, community welfare associations and faith-based actors remained central providers of basic, maternal and early childhood care, despite being underresourced.

Socioeconomic situation

59. The socioeconomic situation in Myanmar deteriorated, driven by sustained conflict, macroeconomic instability and the compounded effects of the March 2025 earthquake, fuel disruptions and rising import costs. The World Bank has projected a 2 per cent contraction in the country's gross domestic product for the fiscal year 2025/26, while the inflation rate reached 24.6 per cent year-on-year in April.¹⁵ More than half of the population lives below the poverty line, with another third barely above it, reflecting deepening hardship and eroding household purchasing power. Women-headed households were 1.2 times more likely to live in poverty.

¹⁴ See <https://www.who.int/southeastasia/publications/i/item/9789290229667>.

¹⁵ See <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099061526075033335>.

60. Depreciation of the Myanmar kyat, foreign exchange restrictions, multiple exchange rates and import controls constrained access to fuel, medicines, agricultural inputs and industrial raw materials. The reliance of Myanmar on imported fuel left the economy highly exposed to global shocks, with fuel prices more than doubling in some areas. Fuel shortages and price spikes increased transport and production costs, disrupted supply chains and raised operational costs for humanitarian actors. They also affected agricultural production. Rising input costs and limited availability of fuel, seeds and fertilizer threatened the 2026 monsoon planting season. Damaged infrastructure, movement restrictions and conflict-related displacement of farming communities further undermined rural production and markets, raising concerns over future food supply and price stability. The garment sector, historically a key employer of younger women, continued to contract and was estimated to employ roughly 400,000 workers, approximately 40 per cent of the pre-2021 workforce.

61. Food insecurity remained acute. In 2025, Myanmar ranked among the 10 countries globally most affected by acute food insecurity, with particularly severe conditions in conflict-affected areas, including Chin, Kayah, Rakhine and southern Shan States.¹⁶ Projections developed for the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan for 2026 indicate that 12.4 million people would face acute food insecurity during the June to August lean season, including 1 million at emergency levels. The cost of a basic food basket has quadrupled since 2021, continuing to strain household coping capacity.

62. Rakhine State remained among the most affected areas, with poverty estimated to be above 80 per cent and more than one third of households food-insecure.¹⁷ Conflict, displacement, market disruption, movement restrictions and blockages continued to interrupt trade and food supply chains. In northern Rakhine, nutrition indicators reportedly reached extremely severe levels in Buthidaung and critical levels in Maungdaw between November 2025 and May 2026. In Sittwe, fuel and basic commodity prices rose sharply following global fuel disruptions, compounding the impact of restrictions on the movement of goods into Rakhine.

III. Observations

63. I have consistently cautioned that an electoral process without a cessation of hostilities and commitment to inclusive dialogue risks fuelling further violence. The military claimed that the election process was legitimate. However, many on the ground reported tight security, a reduced electorate, the exclusion of major political parties, low turnout and polling conducted during an ongoing armed conflict. The United Nations neither provided support for nor directly observed this process. Many on the ground who participated in and supported the election of a civilian government in 2020 are more determined than ever to seek accountability. They claim that the overthrow of an elected government, the detention of its leaders and continued attacks on civilians cannot justify a return to normalcy. Engagement without reference to these realities is a lost opportunity. I reiterate my call for the immediate and unconditional release of all those arbitrarily detained, including the State Counsellor, Aung San Suu Kyi.

64. Sustainable peace requires an inclusive, credible and transparent political process that reflects the aspirations and rights of all people of Myanmar. The United Nations stands firmly for peaceful, lawful and inclusive processes. Through its

¹⁶ See <https://www.wfp.org/publications/global-report-food-crises-grfc>.

¹⁷ See <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2026>.

agencies, funds and programmes, the United Nations will stay and deliver in Myanmar, despite immense challenges. The international community must remain steadfast in solidarity with the people of Myanmar and be guided by their appeals for help.

65. The deepening crisis in Myanmar, marked by continued armed conflict, grave protection risks for civilians, worsening humanitarian and socioeconomic conditions and serious regional implications, remains alarming. I reiterate my condemnation of all forms of violence. Military means will not bring about a sustainable resolution. Without a genuine cessation of hostilities, meaningful de-escalation and inclusive dialogue, there can be no durable peace or comprehensive political solution. Without addressing the underlying drivers of the crisis, instability will remain entrenched. I call on all parties to prioritize the interests and rights of all people of Myanmar, respect their obligations under international law and protect civilians and aid workers. I urge all sides to continue frank exchanges with my Special Envoy, who remains committed to helping bridge the divide in support of a Myanmar-led and Myanmar-owned peace process. This requires an end to the fighting on all sides.

66. I remain seriously concerned about the impact of conflict on civilians, particularly women, children, young people, persons with disabilities, Rohingya Muslims and other minorities. I call on all parties to end attacks affecting civilians and civilian infrastructure, including homes, schools, hospitals, religious sites and sites hosting displaced people. Civilians must be protected and respected. Aerial bombardments, artillery attacks and other operations that place civilians at risk must cease immediately and all parties must prevent incitement to violence and intercommunal tensions. Women are not only among those most affected by this conflict; they are among the most trusted and effective community-level responders. I call on all partners to support women's civil society organizations and ensure their meaningful participation in all peace, response and recovery efforts.

67. The continued use of forced recruitment and use of young people, including children, in the conflict remains a serious concern. I call on all parties to end forced labour, forced recruitment and conscription practices that expose civilians, including children and young people, to grave harm. Young people must be protected from recruitment, trafficking, unsafe migration and exploitation, and they should be included meaningfully in discussions and processes concerning the future of Myanmar.

68. All parties and all relevant authorities must allow immediate, safe, sustained, predictable and unimpeded humanitarian access to all people in need, wherever they are located and irrespective of territorial control. Bureaucratic impediments, travel authorization delays, checkpoint restrictions and limitations on the movement of humanitarian personnel and supplies must be lifted. I strongly appeal to Member States to provide increased, flexible and sustained funding for life-saving assistance, including food, nutrition, health, education, shelter and protection services.

69. The goal of an inclusive Myanmar cannot be achieved without safety, justice and opportunity for all communities, including the Rohingya, and without addressing the root causes of conflict, discrimination and exclusion. I am deeply concerned by the situation in Rakhine State, where active conflict, severe restrictions on movement, blockades, forced recruitment, extortion, land and property concerns and limited humanitarian access continue to affect Rohingya and other communities. I call on all parties in Rakhine to end violence, protect civilians, ensure non-discriminatory access to assistance and services and prevent intercommunal tensions. Rohingya women, children and young people face particular risks, including gender-based violence, trafficking, exploitation, forced recruitment and exclusion from education, healthcare and livelihoods. Solutions must be Rohingya-led, with sustained support for displaced

communities to articulate their needs and aspirations and shape their own future. Rohingya have themselves appealed for an end to violence, a pathway towards peace, self-reliance, citizenship and the full enjoyment of their rights, and they have stressed that accountability for all perpetrators is essential to reconciliation and sustainable return.

70. Conditions conducive to the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of Rohingya refugees do not currently exist. The root causes of their displacement must be addressed, including citizenship, legal identity, freedom of movement, equal protection under the law, access to livelihoods and basic services and the ability to return to places of origin or choice. Any pathway to return must take account of evolving territorial control and insecurity in Rakhine State and must be based on meaningful and inclusive consultation with affected communities. Rohingya voices, including those of women and young people, must be represented and heard.

71. I thank Bangladesh and the other host countries for continuing to provide protection and assistance to refugees from Myanmar. I call for strengthened international solidarity and increased support to host countries and communities, including through life-sustaining assistance, protection services, education, livelihoods and self-reliance. I urge all States to uphold the principle of non-refoulement and ensure access to protection for those fleeing Myanmar. Member States are also encouraged to adopt a route-based approach through strengthened regional coordination on protection at sea, including search and rescue, predictable disembarkation and action against trafficking and smuggling networks, and to address the root causes and drivers of onward movements.

72. The continued reports of serious violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, including conflict-related sexual violence, gender-based violence, torture, arbitrary detention, attacks on civic space and restrictions on freedom of expression, are deeply troubling. Similarly troubling is the spread of misinformation, disinformation and hate speech, targeting women, Rohingya and other minority communities, in Myanmar and the region. This fuels dehumanization, discrimination and violence. I urge governments, technology companies and other parties to prevent platforms from being used to incite violence.

73. Perpetrators of serious international crimes and grave human rights violations must be held accountable. I call on all parties to cooperate with relevant United Nations mechanisms, including the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, and urge Member States to support efforts to preserve evidence, protect witnesses and pursue accountability. Ending impunity is essential to breaking cycles of violence and creating conditions for justice, reconciliation and durable peace.

74. As the multilayered crisis in Myanmar continues unabated, its consequences are increasingly being felt beyond the country's borders, with growing implications for regional stability and international peace and security. The international community must not cede its moral responsibility by allowing this crisis to recede from view. We must collectively work for a genuine cessation of hostilities, unimpeded humanitarian access regardless of territorial control and the creation of conditions conducive to inclusive dialogue as an important off-ramp for peace. The United Nations has an indispensable role to play together with ASEAN in that regard. My Special Envoy will sustain global attention, including on the protection and humanitarian needs of civilians, and keep channels open for dialogue towards this end. I am concerned that, amid competing global crises, Myanmar risks slipping off the international agenda. It must not.

75. I thank my Special Envoy, the country team and all staff members working on and in Myanmar for their tireless work and dedication in support of peace and stability in the country.
